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Abstract: In this paper, we first replicated Harrison et al. (2012). Then, we studied if the group’s size has an impact on 
group’s risk aversion. In line with Harrison et al. (2012), our results confirm that no significant differences occur 
between individuals and groups risk aversion in three-person group. We also found that group size does not affect the 
level of risk aversion. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade, several scholars investigated groups’ risk attitudes. However, they did not 
achieve a univocal position. Some of them reported that groups are more risk adverse than 
individuals (Ambrus et al., 2015; Baker et al., 2008; Bateman and Munro, 2005; Shupp and 
Williams, 2008; Masclet et al., 2009). Conversely, other studies show that groups tend to be less 
risk adverse (Rockenbach et al., 2001; Zhang and Casari, 2012). In a recent paper Harrison et al. 
(2012) studied preferences over social risk. Their main result was that individuals and groups risk 
attitude was not statistically different. 
So far, most studies have tested three-person groups (Baker et al. 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; 
Harrison et al., 2012; Zhang and Casari, 2012; Brunette et al., 2015), but the size of the group could 
matter (Sutter, 2005; Charness and Sutter, 2012). Thus, in this work, on one hand, we replicate 
Harrison et al. (2012) in order to investigate the link between individual and group preferences 
towards risk; on the other hand we extend it in order to analyse the impact of the group size on 
preferences over social risk. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first present the experimental design 
in Section 2. Then, we report our results in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design 
Our experiment was conducted on a heterogeneous sample of 300 students from Universitat Jaume 
I. Participants were presented with 10 binary lottery1 choices (Table 1).  
 
 
TABLE 1 - The 10 binary lottery choices (Harrison et. al., 2012) 
 
Payoffs were all converted in euros (Figure 1). We showed all the 10 pairs of lotteries one by 																																																								1	The same used in Harrison et al. (2012).	
Lottery A Lottery B 
50 ECU 40 ECU 96,25 ECU 2.50 ECU 
10% 90% 10% 90% 
20% 80% 20% 80% 
30% 70% 30% 70% 
40% 60% 40% 60% 
50% 50% 50% 50% 
60% 40% 60% 40% 
70% 30% 70% 30% 
80% 20% 80% 20% 
90% 10% 90% 10% 
100% 0% 100% 0% 	
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one, while participants took note of which one they preferred to play on booklet we provided in 
advance. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 - Example of Lotteries Presented 
 
After collecting answers subject by subject, we merged them using the majority rule in order 
to bring out which would be the group choice when this rule is applied. 
In doing so, we randomly formed groups of three persons (100 groups), five persons (60 
groups), ten persons (30 groups), fifteen persons (20 groups) and 25 persons (12 groups). 
Overall, we run the experiment in 10 occasions. No person took part in the experiment in 
more than one occasion. The whole session took on average 20 minutes. 
 
3. Results  
First, we processed data from individuals. Then, we carried out the analysis on groups’ decision. 
The graph below (Figure 2) reports the percentage of choices for A (the safe option). It compares 
individual choices (rhombus line), and group choices elicited with majority rule for different group 
sizes. The line labelled “Risk Neutrality” represents the choice of a risk neutral decision maker 
(subject or group). A risk-neutral subject (group) should switch from A to B at the 5th decision 
problem. A switch in later decisions reveals risk aversion, while a switch in earlier decisions reveals 
risk-seeking behaviour. 
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FIGURE 2 – Distribution of safe choices (A) per individual and group size 
 
It is useful to clarify that a rational subject (group) with monotonic preferences should switch 
from the safer to the riskier option just once and never switch back. Instead, some subjects (group) 
switched from A to B and vice versa more than once. This behaviour can be due to several reasons: 
either these subjects are genuinely indifferent towards different lotteries, or they are irrational (do 
not respect monotonicity), or it is just a mistake. For our purpose, we consider this behaviour a 
“mistake” when only one switchback occurred. In these cases, we fixed the error and included that 
subject into the computation, since the real intention was clear. On the contrary, we labelled as 
“irrational” those participants who showed multiple switches, and we did not considered them in the 
calculation, because their intentions were not so clear2. Number of observations with multiple 
switches is shown in Table 2 as well as the average CRRA coefficient for individual and different 
group sizes. 
 
 Observations with 
multiple switch 
Average CRRA3 Std. Dev. CRRA 
Individuals 24 -0.0410 0.5041 
Group3 0 -0.0035 0.3358 
Group5 1 -0.0008 0.3258 
Group15 0 -0.0980 0.1782 
Group25 0 -0.1333 0.1648 
TABLE 2 – Descriptive statistics of CRRA distributions 
 
Looking at Table 2 we can state our first result: groups respect monotonicity more than the 																																																								
2 On this procedure, see Jacobson and Petrie (2009) 
3 For this evaluation, we took into account 276 individuals, all the groups of three members, 59 groups of five members 
and all the groups with fifteen and twenty-five members. 
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individuals that compose them.  
As we can notice from figure 2, we observe a risk shift for both individuals and groups. 
Indeed, the switching point occurs at lottery number 4. However, individuals and small groups seem 
to be the more distant from the risk neutrality than larger groups. Results from two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on distributions of switching points, and risk neutrality across different 
group size show that distributions of switching points are statistically different from risk neutral 
distribution for individuals, three-member groups, and five-member groups. Instead, there is not a 
statistically difference for fifteen-member groups and twenty-five-member groups (Table 3). This 
brings us to our second result: risk shift is more severe for individuals and small groups (3, 5 
person groups) than large groups.  
Ten two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were carried, in order to compare individuals’ 
and groups’ distributions of switching points. Comparing individuals and three-member groups we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality; we can, now, state our third result: no significant 
differences occur between individuals and groups risk aversion in three-person group. 
 
K-S (p-value) Group3 Group5 Group15 Group25 Risk 
Neutrality 
Individual 0.142 0.399 0.230 0.286 0.000 
Group3 - 0.721 0.341 0.370 0.000 
Group5 - - 0.987 0.944 0.001 
Group15 - - - 1.00 0.172 
Group25 - - - - 0.249 
TABLE 3 – Results from two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on distributions of switching points 
 
In addition to this, the same analysis on distributions of switching points and CRRA 
coefficients across groups of different size did not yield any significant difference (Table 3). Hence 
we can state our fourth result: group size has no impact on risk aversion. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this research, we first replicate Harrison et al. (2012). Then, we study if the group’s size has an 
impact on group’s risk aversion when a majority aggregation rule is applied. In line with Harrison et 
al. (2012), our results confirm that no significant differences occur between individuals and group 
risk aversion in three-person groups. Furthermore, this result is also confirmed in case of larger 
groups. Indeed, our follow-up analysis on groups of three, five, fifteen and twenty-five members 
showed that distributions of switching point were not statistically different across larger and smaller 
groups.  
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